This empirical paper examines the question of whether movements in housing sales predict subsequent movement in house prices -or the converse. The former (positive) relationship is well hypothesized by several frictional search models of housing market transactions or "churn". The latter relationship has been hypothesized by two theories. Both loss aversion and liquidity or down-payment constraints suggest another positive relationship in which lower prices generate lower sales volume. Our contribution to the problem of unraveling causality is to use a panel of 101 markets over the period from 1980 through 2006. With several different estimation techniques we conclusively find that higher sales volume always generates higher subsequent prices. Higher prices, however always generate lower subsequent sales volume. Our conclusion is that aggregate data provides little support for theories of housing loss aversion or financial constraint. In fact these latter theories are inconsistent with the aggregate movements in prices and sales.
I. Introduction.
The relationship between housing transaction volumes {"sales") and price movements has been the subject of several economic models -with the direction of causality being quite different. In one camp, several papers in "behavioral microeconomics" have argued that when prices fall, homeowners have an aversion to selling at a loss -no matter how "rational" selling may be [Genesove and Mayer (2001) , Englehardt (2003) ]. Another group of papers comes to a similar conclusion, but through using liquidity and down payment constraints [Chan (2001) , Stein (1995) , Lamont and Stein (1999) . The implication of both micro-economic theories is that after price declines, sales should be reduced, and following price increases, sales should recover.
A different group of papers, examine how owners trade housing in the presence of search frictions [Wheaton (1990) , Berkovic and Goodman (1996) , Lundberg and Skedinger (1999) ]. As is true with most frictional market models (e.g. Pissarides 2000) , increases in turnover (sales) tends to make trading easier and in the housing market this will increase prices. Hence, in this camp the hypothesis is that positive shocks to sales will then increase prices while negative shocks will depress them.
There have been few attempts to test whether actual movements in sales and prices support one, or the other, or both theories. This is complicated by the fact that both theories predict positive relationships, just with different timing. Berkovec and Goodman (1996) find empirical support for the frictional models by showing that demand shocks first show up in sales volume, and subsequently impact prices. Leung, Lau, and Leong (2002) undertake a time series analysis of Hong Kong Housing and conclude that Granger Causality is found more often for sales driving prices. Andrew and Meen (2003) examines the time series for the UK and using a VAR model, conclude that transactions respond to shocks more quickly than prices, but do not "cause" price responses. In their VAR model it is interesting that the coefficient of lagged prices on transactions is negative and not positive as posited by Loss Aversion or liquidity constraints. All of these studies are hampered by short time series and relatively low frequency. Granger tests are known to more valid when undertaken with more extensive observations at high frequency.
In this paper, we try to solve some of these problems with a panel approach -we examine the movements in prices and sales over 27 years in 101 US metropolitan areas. With almost 2500 observations we effectively ask how our two series are related collectively across all major US markets. We find strong evidence that sales positively impact subsequent prices, but that prices negatively impact subsequent sales.
We obtain these results with Fixed Effects estimation and also with GLS IV estimates that correct for the panel Heteroskedasticity identified by Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen (1988) . Furthermore, our results are robust to whether the models are estimated in levels (which are non stationary) or in first-differences (which are stationary). We conclude that theories of Loss Aversion and Liquidity constraints are just not consistent with the aggregate behavior of US housing data, while there is complete consistency with frictional trading models.
Our paper is organized as follows. In the next section we discuss the application of panel data to our question, the use of conditioning variables and the alternative estimation approaches to be applied. In section II we review the various theoretical arguments and empirical support for the two categories of relationships between sales volume and housing price movements. In section III, we review data sources and find some interesting and yet puzzling trends in the only available time series for sales. These trends encourage estimation in differences. In section IV we present a range of estimation approaches, and then in section V discuss the results of each specification. Section VI illustrates how our equations operate together as a VAR model and Section VI draws some conclusions as to why we get results so different from the micro-level research.
II. Sales Volume-Price relationships in the Literature.
There are a series of paper's which propose a relationship in which prices or changes in prices will subsequently "cause" sales volumes to adjust. The first of these is by Stein (1995) followed by Lamont and Stein (1999) and then Chan (2001) . In these models, liquidity constrained consumers are mostly moving from one house to another (market "churn") and must make a down payment in order to purchase housing. When prices decline consumer equity does likewise and fewer households have the remaining down payment to make the lateral move. As prices recover so does market liquidity. In effect price changes should positively cause sales volumes -both up and down.
A second series of papers suggest a different mechanism which also generates at least a partial positive causal chain between prices and sales volume. Relying on "behavior economics", Genesove and Mayer (2001) and then Englehardt (2003) test for whether sellers who will experience a loss when the sell set higher reservations than those who will not experience a loss. This form of "loss aversion" suggests that as prices drop, transaction volume will do likewise as overly high seller reservations increasingly are unrealistic. If prices continue to drop; more and more sellers will find themselves in a situation with Loss Aversion. As long as prices are rising, however, the theory makes little prediction about what will happen to Sales volume other than eliminating the source of any aversion.
A different group of papers, explicitly models how owners trade housing in the presence of search frictions [Wheaton (1990) , Lundberg and Skedinger (1999) ]. In these models, there exists a powerful positive relationship between sales time and prices -in fact prices are virtually inverse to sales time. This is because prices are like "funny money" and it is only the transaction cost of owning 2 homes (during the moving trade) that grounds prices. The transaction costs of moving are essentially the product of price level and sales time -where the latter equals vacancy divided by the sales flow. In these models, vacancy is exogenous, but sales flow is endogenous -depending in part on an exogenous rate of "churn". As long as an increase in the "churn rate" does not reduce search effort, sales time will be shorter with more churn and prices therefore higher. In a similar manner, and following Pissarides (2000) , Berkovec and Goodman (1996) develop a model in which a reduction (increase) in sales volume generates a greater (smaller) inventory of unsold homes, and this in turn leads to lower (higher) seller reservations. In both of these models, there is clear temporal causality: a shock occurs first to sales volume which then impacts price.
There have been few attempts to test whether actual movements in sales and prices support one, or the other, or both theories. This is complicated by the fact that both theories predict positive relationships, just with different timing. Berkovic and Goodman (1996) initially found that movements in volume did lead movements in prices and inferred that this was consistent with their theory. Leung, Lau, and Leong (2002) undertake a time series analysis of Hong Kong Housing and conclude that Granger Causality also is found more often for sales driving prices. Andrew and Meen (2003) examines the time series for the UK and using a VAR model, conclude that transactions respond to shocks more quickly than prices, but do not necessarily "cause" price responses. In their VAR model it is interesting that the coefficient of lagged prices on transactions is negative and not positive as posited by Loss Aversion or liquidity constraints.
III. Sales Volume and Price Data.
Our Price data is the OFHEO repeat sales series [Baily, Muth, Nourse (1963) ].
This data series has recently been severely questioned as not factoring out home improvements or maintenance and not factoring in depreciation or obsolescence [Case, Pollakowski, Wachter (1991) , Harding, Rosenthal, Sirmans (2007) ]. These omissions could significantly bias the trend in the OFEHO series. That said we are left with what is available, and the OFHEO index is the only consistent series available for most US markets over a long time period. The only alternative is to purchase similar indices from CSW/FISERV, but they have all the same methodological issues as the OFHEO data.
The sales data we use are from National Association of Realtors (NAR). This data is for single family units only (it excludes condominium sales), was obtained for each market from 1980-2006. Raw sales were then compared with annual Census estimates of the number of total households in those markets. Dividing the sales by total households we get an effective sales rate for each market. In 1980 this sales rate varied between 1.2% and 5.1% across our markets with an average of 2.8%. By contrast, in the 1980 Census, the single family mobility rate averaged 8.0%. In 1990 the average sales rate had climbed to 3.5% while the Census Mobility rate fell to 6.5%. By 2000, the sales rate reached 5.0%, while the Census mobility rate recovered just a bit to 7.1%. Thus during this 25 year period, our calculated average sales rates are always lower than the census reported mobility rates. This is because the household series used to create the rate is total households rather than just single family owner-occupied households. Separate renter/owner and unit-in-structure household series at yearly frequency are just not available by market.
1 However, the observation that the two data sources trend differently is more disturbing. Over 1980-2000, both the US homeownership ratio and the fraction of single family units are virtually unchanged. Thus the difference between mobility and sale rate trends is not due to the way we constructed the latter series. In Figure 1 we show a scatter plot that illustrates the relationship between the changes in these two measures across our 101 markets. The NAR sales rate increases significantly between 1990 and 2000 while the Census mobility rate decreases in almost as many areas as it increases. It is clear that there is no association over this decade between which markets saw an increase in sales and which experienced any underlying increase in mobility (R 2 =.002). however, exhibit far greater price volatility. Atlanta's average sales rate is close to 5%
while San Francisco's is almost half of that (2.6%).
Both of these individual markets also illustrate the strong trend to the sales data that is present in virtually all MSA. The constructed sales rates rise sharply upwards over this 25 year period -increasing cumulatively by as much as 2 to 4 percentage points. As mentioned relative to Figure 1 , the Census reports only a slight increase in both owner and renter "move" rates between 1990 and 2000 and a decline between 1980 and 1990.
Thus the NAR trend would appear to represent some artifact of reporting. Perhaps a growing share of brokers became members of the NAR or a growing share of members participated in reporting data. Whatever the reason, it seems clear that the trend does not reflect a true doubling in US mobility. It is difficult to think of reasons why sales would trend significantly different from mobility -particularly across markets 2 . In appendix I
we present the summary statistics for each market's price and sales rate series.
Given the reservations over the trends in both series it is useful and important to test for series stationarity. There are two tests available for use with panel data such as we have. In each, the null hypothesis is that all of the individual series have unit roots and are non stationary. Levin-Lin (1993) and Im-Persaran-Shin (2002) both develop a test statistic for the sum or average coefficient of the lagged variable of interest -across the individuals (markets) within the panel. The null is that all or the average of these coefficients is not significantly different from unity. In Table 1 we report the results of this test for both housing price and sale rate levels, as well as a 2 nd order stationarity test for housing price and sales rate changes. With the Levin-Lin test we cannot reject the null (non-stationarity) for either house price levels or differences. In terms of the sales, we can reject the null for differences in sales rate differences, but not for levels. The IPS test (which is argued to have more power) rejects the null for house price levels and differences and for sales rate differences. In short, differences in both variables would seem to be stationary in differences, but levels are more problematic and likely non-stationary. 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 8 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 grrhpi grsalesrate 1 9 8 9 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 8 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 Our panel approach uses a well-known application of Granger-type analysis. We will ask how significant lagged sales are in a panel model of prices which uses lagged prices and then several conditioning variables. The conditioning variables we choose are market area employment levels and national mortgage rates. The companion model is to ask how significant lagged prices are in a panel model of sales using lagged sales and the same conditioning variables. This pair of model is shown (1)-(2).
In panel models, all of the estimation issues raised in time series continue to exist.
In our case there is concern about the stationarity of both price and sales rate levels. This same concern is not present for differences. Hence clearly we will need to estimate the model in first differences as well as levels -as outlined in equations (3) and (4).
In panel models with a cross-section fixed effect (the i i η δ and ) there exists a potential specification issue. Since the fixed effects are present not just in current, but lagged values of the dependent variables, OLS will not lead to consistent estimates. The problem is a built in correlation between the error term and the variables on the RHS.
Thus estimates and tests on the parameters of interest (the γ α and ) will not be reliable.
The problem can be ameliorated to some extent by normalizing the variables to make the fixed effects vanish -for example when prices are measured as an index that begins with a value of 100 for each cross section sample. Similarly using a sales rate (rather than the actual sales volume) will help the problem. To be safe, however, we also estimated the models following an estimation strategy by Holtz-Eakin et al to better estimate the causal values of the parameters of interest. As discussed in Appendix II, this amounts to using 2-period lagged values of sales and prices as instruments with GLS estimation.
From either estimates, we conduct a "Granger" causality test. Since we are only testing for a single restriction, the t statistic is the square root of the F statistic that would be used to test the hypothesis in the presence of a longer lag structure (Green, 2003) .
Hence, we can simply use a t test (applied to the 2 2 and γ α ) as the to check of whether changes in sales "Granger' cause change in price and vice versa.
V. Results.
In table 2 we report the results of equations (1) through (4) in each set of rows.
The first column uses OLS estimation, the second the Random effects IV estimates from Holtz-Eakin et al. The first set of equations is in levels, while the second set of rows reports the results using differences.
Among the levels equations, we first notice that the two conditioning variables, the national mortgage rate and local employment can have the wrong signs -here in two cases. The mortgage interest rate in the OLS price levels equation and local employment in the IV sales rate equation are miss-signed. There is also an insignificant employment coefficient in the OLS sales rate equation (despite almost 2500 observations). Another troublesome result is that the price levels equation has excess "momentum" -lagged prices have a coefficient greater than one. Hence prices (levels) can grow on their own without necessitating any increases in fundamentals, or sales. We suspect that these two anomalies are likely the result of the non-stationary feature to both the price and sales series in levels. Interestingly, the two estimation techniques yield quite similar coefficients -as well as these anomalies.
When we move to the results of estimating the equations in differences these issues disappear. The lagged price coefficients are small, the price equations stable in the 2 nd degree, and the signs of all coefficients are both correct -and highly significant.
As to the question of causality, in every price or price growth equation, lagged sales or growth in sales is always significant. Furthermore in every sales rate or growth in sales rate equation, lagged price (or their growth) is always significant. Hence there is clear evidence of joint causality, but the effect of lagged prices on sales is always of the wrong sign! Holding lagged sales (and conditioning variables) constant, a year after there is an increase in prices -sales fall -rather than rise! The impact is exactly the opposite of that predicted by theories of loss aversion or liquidity constraints.
TABLE 2
Fixed Effects E Holtz-Eakin estimator We have experimented with these models using more than a single lag, but qualitatively the results are the same. In levels, the price equation with two lags becomes dynamically stable in the sense that the sum of the lagged price coefficients is less than one. As to causal inference, the sum of the lagged sales coefficients is positive, highly significant, and passes the Granger F test. In the sales rate equation, the sum of the two lagged sales rates is virtually identical to the single coefficient above and the lagged price levels are again significantly negative (in their sum) and collectively Granger "cause" a reduction in sales. We have similar conclusions when two lags are used in the differences equations. In differences, however, the 2 nd lag is always insignificant.
As a final test, we investigate a relationship between the growth in house prices and the level of the sales rate. While mixing of levels and changes in time series analysis is generally not standard, it is clear that several of the theories of loss aversion and liquidity constraints relate price changes to sales levels. With this in mind we offer up Table 3 . In terms of causality, these results are no different than the traditional models estimated either in all levels or all differences. One year after an increase in the level of sales, the growth in house prices accelerates. Similarly, one year after house price growth accelerates the level of home sales falls (rather than rises). All conditioning variables are significant and correctly signed and lagged dependent variables have coefficient less than one.
VI. VAR System Behavior.
The next step in our analysis is to more extensively investigate the dynamic relationship between these two variables. When taken together, they represent a 2- Prices rise 10% but follow the movement in sales. Both of these response patterns seem in accord with theory and suggest that the levels equations together closely reflect how housing markets should react to demand shocks.
In Figure 5 we examine the behavior of the pair of equations estimated in differences. Here our base line steady growth path has Atlanta employment increasing 2% yearly while mortgage rates are declining at 0.33% yearly. The impulse response traces out what happens if the employment growth rate permanently jumps to a very robust 4%. Prices, which were trending at -5.24%, now grow at a little more than 0.23% while the sales rate jumps from 6% to 6.79% at steady state. The reaction of sales to the positive demand shock is again much quicker than the reaction of prices -as several previous studies have found. The results of this analysis are completely consistent with theories of frictional markets in which sales should "Granger cause" prices to increase. On the other hand they are completely inconsistent with theories of loss aversion or liquidity constraints, wherein falling (rising) house prices should constrain (free up) buyers and "Granger cause" sales to fall (rise). Instead, sales in the market tend to react negatively to price movements.
This occurs in models of both price movements as well as differences. An explanation might be based on the behavior of marginal first time buyers who enter only when prices are lower. If the net flow into and out of homeownership responds negatively to prices then the overall sales rate could respond as we have identified. This is our best explanation for why our results using aggregate data stand in such stark contrast to the carefully constructed micro-economic analyses of loss aversion and liquidity constraints. 
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